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Comparative Cognition: Past, Present, and Future
Michael J. Beran, Audrey E. Parrish
Georgia State University
Bonnie M. Perdue
Agnes Scott College
David A. Washburn
Georgia State University
Comparative cognition is the field of inquiry concerned with understanding the cognitive abilities and mechanisms that are evident in
nonhuman species. Assessments of animal cognition have a long history, but in recent years there has been an explosion of new
research topics, and a general broadening of the phylogenetic map of animal cognition. To review the past of comparative cognition, we
describe the historical trends. In regards to the present state, we examine current “hot topics” in comparative cognition. Finally, we
offer our unique and combined thoughts on the future of the field.

“Man with all his noble qualities... still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin.”
Charles Darwin
“Intelligence is based on how efficient a species became at doing the things they need to survive.”
Charles Darwin
Comparative psychology was born from the idea that there are psychological qualities, attributes, and
processes that are shared across species, likely in part because of our common biology and histories. Darwin
noted that species shared not only a biological history (first quote above) but also perhaps a psychological one
and that the psychological evolution of species might well select for increases in intelligence, primarily as such
intelligence would afford adaptation of minds as well as bodies to changing environments (second quote).
Comparative psychology is now well into its second century, is thriving as an area of inquiry in the social
sciences, and it has contributed to a fuller understanding of the principles above.
What is the state of comparative psychology as it pertains to issues relevant to the field of Cognition?
This was the mission we were given, to provide a relatable and concise answer regarding the (relatively brief)
history, current status, and future directions for the area of research commonly called comparative cognition.
It is a daunting mission, in part because it is highly unlikely that any two comparative psychologists writing
such an article would come to the same conclusions. The diversity of opinions on what we, as comparative
psychologists interested in cognition, do well, and on what is, and should be, our primary focus is likely very
large. And so we began the effort by recognizing that the best way of providing something of value was to not
have one opinion, or even two. What you read here is an attempt to present coherently (we hope!) the opinions
Michael J. Beran, Language Research Center, Georgia State University; Audrey E. Parrish, Department of Psychology, Georgia State
University; Bonnie M. Perdue, Department of Psychology, Agnes Scott College; David A. Washburn, Department of Psychology,
Georgia State University. Portions of this paper were prepared to mark the 50th anniversary of Bitterman’s (1960) “Toward a
comparative psychology of learning” and were presented in an American Psychological Association symposium organized following
Bitterman’s death to honor his many career contributions. Correspondence concerning this article can be addressed to Michael Beran,
Language Research Center, Georgia State University, University Plaza, Atlanta, GA 30302. Email to mjberan@yahoo.com. Support
for the writing of this paper was provided by NIH grant HD060563 and by the Duane M. Rumbaugh Fellowship at Georgia State
University.

of four comparative psychologists at different points in their careers. Parrish is a graduate student nearing
completion of her doctoral studies, Perdue is an assistant professor a few years out of graduate school, Beran is
a mid-career researcher, and Washburn is a senior scientist. Each of us brings our own experiences and our
own perspectives to this task. Because of our shared interests and shared resources as researchers working
with primates, this means we also will bring certain biases.
We begin with an historical overview of comparative psychology and its contributions to cognitive
science. We then survey the field today with regard to what topics are within the purview of the field, where
those data are reported, and what changes in this field have occurred in just the past couple of decades. Our
goal here is not to provide a comprehensive overview of every species tested in every area of comparative
cognition but rather to give the reader some sense of what the current field of comparative cognition entails.
Finally, we offer the unique perspectives we each have on what the future of this field should be and why
comparative psychology has such a promising future in furthering our understanding of the cognitive sciences.
A (Relatively Brief) History of Comparative Psychology
Knowledge regarding the animal mind, like knowledge of human minds other than our own, must
come by way of inference from behavior. Two fundamental questions then confront the comparative
psychologist. First, by what method shall he find out how an animal behaves? Second, how shall he
interpret the conscious aspect of that behavior? (Washburn, 1908, p. 4)
One would stimulate little debate by calling Darwin’s (1871) Descent of Man (or perhaps his
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals published the following year) the first textbook of
comparative psychology, although the birthday of psychology itself as a separate scientific discipline is
generally accepted as 1879, and although one can cite much earlier reports of animal behavior that include
some aspects of cognition (for example, Aristotle’s History of Animals). The point here is that the history of
comparative psychology is about as long as the history of psychology itself. Shortly after Professors Wundt,
James, Hall, and others established the laboratories, wrote the influential books, and founded the academic
departments, scholarly journals, and professional organizations that defined the new discipline, some of their
academic offspring were describing the methods and findings of psychology with respect to animal behavior
and animal consciousness. Noteworthy early contributions to this field include classic publications by
Romanes (1882, 1883), Morgan (1894), Thorndike (1898, 1911), Small (1900, 1901), Mills (1899), Hobhouse
(1901), von Uexküll (1957), and numerous contributions by Yerkes (which we represent with citation of his
first book, The Dancing Mouse (1907), that he envisioned as a kind of laboratory manual for courses in
comparative psychology, comparable to supplements on frog physiology that were once common in courses on
comparative anatomy).
As indicated by the quotation above, we have taken Margaret Floy Washburn’s (1908) influential The
Animal Mind: A Text-Book of Comparative Psychology as a starting point for our discussion. Washburn’s
textbook was obviously not the first publication in comparative psychology; indeed, even in its first edition,
Washburn referenced more than 400 studies, including the contributions cited above and many others that
would properly be classified as comparative psychology. We highlight the importance of The Animal Mind in
the history of comparative cognition because of its impact. Updated through four editions, the last published in
1936, Washburn’s text has been a highly influential reference for generations of comparative psychologists.
Even in the 1957 second edition of his classic A History of Experimental Psychology (1929), Boring described
The Animal Mind as “the classical text” (pg. 659). But it is not just the longevity of Washburn’s synthesis and
review that encourages us to highlight its historical importance; we also recognize the unapologetic boldness
with which Professor Washburn approached the topics of animal cognition—including animal consciousness—
without deviating from the experimental method or the reliance on behavior as the source of our data. While
acknowledging the methodological difficulties associated with the study of animal minds, Washburn
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steadfastly defended that these difficulties are not different in kind (although they may be in degree) than the
challenges of studying mental processes in our own species.
Must we accept the statement that no knowledge whatever of the animal mind is attainable? If so, we
must also admit that human psychology is impossible. Our acquaintance with the mind of animals rests
upon the same basis as our acquaintance with the mind of our fellow-man; both are derived by
inference from observed behavior. The actions of our fellow-men resemble our own, and we therefore
infer in them like subjective states to ours: the actions of animals resemble ours less completely, but
the difference is one of degree, not of kind….The mental processes in other minds, animal or human,
cannot indeed be objectively ascertained facts; the facts are those of human and animal behavior; but
the mental processes are as justifiable inferences as any others with which science deals. (Washburn,
1908, p. 23)
Margaret Floy Washburn’s The Animal Mind also serves to illustrate why there is a comparative
psychology. Whereas her own motivation to write the textbook stemmed from her great love of animals and
nature (Washburn, 1930), the volume is a comprehensive, process-focused review of the behavioral evidence
for mental activity associated with sensation and perception, attention, learning, memory, reasoning, tool use,
affect and motivation. Within each topic, a wide range of species get discussed—amoebas, ants, bees,
caterpillars, cats, chickens, chubs, clams, cockroaches, cows, crabs, crayfish, dogs, dragonflies, earthworms,
elephants, flies, frogs, goldfish, grasshoppers, guinea pigs, horseshoe crabs, jellyfish, lancelets, leeches, mice,
minnows, monkeys, pigeons, pike, planarians, potato beetles, raccoons, rats, salamanders, sea anemones, seaurchins, shrimps, silkworms, snails, spiders, tortoises, wasps, and water beetles. The clear goal of these
discussions is to analyze evidence of animal minds, wherever this evidence is manifest in behavior,
irrespective of species. The goal of comparative psychology is psychology, and the assumption (given that
humans are not unique in the capacity to behave) is that psychology is inherently comparative.
Thus, through this point in history, we can trace the field’s efforts to study, to describe, to explain, and
to predict the behavior of a wide range of nonhuman animals, as well as attempts by many of these
comparative psychologists to make reasonable inferences about the unobservable cognitive or mental
processes that underlie some of these behaviors. A comprehensive review of the history of comparative
psychology, or even just comparative cognition, is beyond the scope of this article -- and is, in any case,
unnecessary as there are already numerous excellent scholarly reviews in the literature. For many of these, we
are indebted to the careful scholarship of Donald Dewsbury (2013). Thus, the history of the discipline has
been told chronologically (Dewsbury, 1984; Wasserman, 1997), biographically (Innis, 1998), geographically
(Dewsbury, 1992; Malakhovskaya, 1992; Takasuna, 2010), conceptually (Wasserman, 1993), and as an epic
tale of triumphs and tragedies (Dewsbury, 1992; Lockard, 1971).
We have previously discussed the history of comparative psychology, using apparatus innovations as
milestones in this journey (Washburn, Beran, Evans, Hoffman & Flemming, 2013; Washburn, Rumbaugh &
Putney, 1994). A disadvantage of this approach would be any implication that comparative psychology
required apparatus. Certainly this is not true, and a great number of outstanding contributions to the
comparative literature relied on little or no apparatus (unless, in the playful spirit of the famous comparative
psychologist Emil Menzel one chooses to refer to natural objects like trees and rivers as apparatus; see Menzel,
1969). An advantage of organizing a discussion of the history of comparative psychology (or any branch of
psychology) using developments of apparatus and paradigms is that it emphasizes the way that research
answers are inextricably tied to the methods used to ask the research questions. That is, the study of human
and nonhuman animal minds depends critically on how “mind” is measured. This is the first part of the
Washburn (1908) quotation that began this section of the present article, and remains as true now as it was a
century ago. Thorndike’s (1898) views on animal intelligence were driven by clear data showing trial-anderror learning as a function of the consequences of behavior; however, these data were constrained by the
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selection and design of the problem-box apparatus which prevented Thorndike’s animal subjects from learning
any way other than by trial-and-error. Similarly, the operant chamber or Skinner box was an elegant and
powerful apparatus for investigating changes in the rate of responding under highly simplified and controlled
conditions. Is it really any surprise that simple associative principles could describe and predict behavior in
these contexts, where only simple competencies could be manifest?
Contemporary comparative research at many laboratories uses computer-based apparatus (what we
have called the “Rumbaughx” in honor of comparative psychologist Duane Rumbaugh who was, and remains,
a pioneer in the use of computers to study cognition comparatively; see Washburn et al., 2013). This
computerized hardware and associated software allows animals to respond to a wide range of stimuli and
game-like task demands. The paradigm allows the testing of animals under conditions that mimic those for
Thorndike’s cats or Skinner’s pigeons (for example); but the paradigm also yields possibilities for
demonstrating cognitive competencies that are not easily described by classical and operant conditioning—as
indeed previous investigators (Kohler, 1925; Tolman, 1932, 1948) have shown with their own apparatus
innovations.
Because the Rumbaughx provides an apparatus, task software, and set of research procedures for
studying cognition in nonhuman animals that are the same as the apparatus, task software, and research
procedures used for studying cognition in humans, there is unsurpassed comparability and opportunity to
argue, with appropriate tentativeness and precautions and convergence, from analogy. This speaks to the
second part of Washburn’s (1908) quote, and the defense that she and many others (Burghardt, 1985;
Rumbaugh, 1994) have repeatedly made about the heuristic value of a critical anthropomorphism. Given the
strong opposition that many comparative psychologists, from Thorndike (1911) to Wynne (2007) have directed
toward anthropomorphism, quite often with justification, perhaps it would be better to describe the position
advocated by Washburn (1908) and others as “critical comparativism.” That is, it seems important to use the
same standards for inferring cognitive processes from behavioral evidence, whether the subjects of interest are
human or nonhuman. As Wynne (2007) asks in the title of his paper, “What are animals?” Margaret Floy
Washburn would respond, “Humans are animals” and the present authors would concur—as indeed would
Professor Wynne. In every case, Wynne’s cautions about the perils of inference are well taken and important,
as are the historical lessons about clever animals and the role of cuing in animal performances (Pfungst, 1911),
and so forth. But these are equally potent cautions with respect to studies of human cognition as of animal
cognition.
The “Rise” of Comparative Cognition
Although Beach (1950) famously decried the state of comparative psychology, Dewsbury (1984, 1998,
2000) has contested this point. Apparatus innovations by Yerkes, Tolman, Lashley, Harlow and others helped
to sustain comparative psychology through the middle of the last century, the heyday of behaviorism in North
America. Nevertheless, Beach’s criticism that comparative psychology was insufficiently comparative (i.e., it
studied too few species, and too few topics within psychology) had plenty of bite, and rang too true. A decade
after Beach declared “the snark was a boojum,” Bitterman (1960) reached the same conclusion in a classic
paper, “Toward a comparative psychology of learning.” In this publication, Bitterman described two broad
strategies for comparative investigation: one involved testing multiple species on one or more standard tests,
well-illustrated by the research traditions of Harlow, Rumbaugh and others (see also Maier and Schneirla,
1964); the other involved development of a comprehensive theory (of learning, for example) in two different
species, with the goal of comparing the theories rather than the animals per se. In support of this latter strategy
(and demonstrating the creativity that marked his career), Bitterman proceeded to describe apparatus
innovations that made it possible to include studies of fish, crabs, blowflies, and earthworms into a truly
comparative psychology of learning.
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Bitterman examined publications in the decade following Beach (1950) and concluded that there was
no change in the pattern of findings: about 60% of the papers reported studies with rats. Indeed, Bitterman
noted, if one examined additional journals and counted only those studies on learning, about 90% had rats as
the subject. On the fiftieth anniversary of Bitterman (1960), we examined the recent literature to determine
whether comparative cognition was doing any better at being truly comparative—that is, in investigating a
range of species and phenomena. Figure 1 shows the result of our examination of the decade 2001-2010. Note
the diversity of animals being studied, although there are still many publications in which rats or pigeons are
the species of choice. These studies appear primarily, but not exclusively, in Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes and Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior with
investigations of the behavior and cognition of primates and other animals appearing predominantly in the
other two journals surveyed. Note that Shettleworth (1993) had echoed Beach’s (1950) criticisms by
questioning whether comparative cognition was truly comparative when she examined three of these same
journals for the 2005-2007 period and reached a similar conclusion to the one we report here (Shettleworth,
2009).
As noted above, comparative psychology has long embraced the challenge of studying animal
intelligence and animal minds, and this literature is fraught with both accomplishment and failure—just as is
characteristic of studies of these same topics with human animals. And just like the landmark studies of
comparative psychology that emerged in the literature a decade or two after the first studies of human
psychology, it was a decade or two after the so-called “cognitive revolution” in psychology first began before
publications about cognitive animals boldly appeared (e.g., Honig & Fetterman, 1992; Hulse, Fowler, &
Honig, 1978; Roitblat, Bever, & Terrace, 1984). The 1990s saw the blossoming of a comparative cognition,
and the introduction of new societies and journals dedicated to that area of research. Prior to this time, the
main outlets for this research were the Journal of Comparative Psychology (formerly the Journal of
Comparative and Physiological Psychology), Animal Learning and Behavior (now Learning and Behavior),
and the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes (now the Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition), although by no means were these journals publishing large
numbers of papers in comparative cognition. Since the 1990s, new journals have emerged, including Animal
Cognition, Comparative Cognition and Behavioral Reviews, the International Journal of Comparative
Psychology, and Animal Behavior and Cognition (soon to be released). In addition, reports about animal
cognition appeared in journals such as Science, Nature, Psychological Science, Cognition, Animal Behaviour,
and Psychonomic Bulletin & Review.
How does comparative cognition fare with respect to the second criticism levied by Beach (1950),
Bitterman (1960), and others (i.e., too few different problems studied)? It would be difficult to convey
accurately the raw numbers of articles published over the last 20 years, given that many research reports can be
difficult to classify as being about cognitive processes in animals versus other processes, but we made an
attempt to provide approximate numbers for some topics that we will discuss in more detail, if only to
highlight the trend for increasingly greater numbers or lesser numbers of such reports during this time. Figure
2 presents the numbers of papers in successive 2-year periods over the past 20 years from the journals Animal
Cognition and the Journal of Comparative Psychology. As can be seen, in general there have been increases in
each of these areas, although it is also easy to see that broader topic areas such as spatial cognition are
represented much more in these literatures than more specific topic areas. Before one assumes that a topic like
spatial cognition has dominated recent comparative cognition, one needs to view that area against the broader
topic of social cognition, as shown in Figure 3. Clearly, social cognition in animals is a dominant theme in
current comparative psychology (although, of course, spatial cognition is just one aspect of the larger area of
physical cognition that is sometimes contrasted against social cognition). We examined the social cognition
area in even greater detail, so that we might provide some means of representing the diverse range of species
that are tested in contemporary comparative psychology in one dominant area of research. Table 1 presents
these data for just the last 5 years and just in the journal Animal Cognition, which represents the broader
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comparative literature and also indicates how robust the investigation of the social-cognitive lives of animals
has become.

Figure 1. Number of publications (2001 – 2010) by animal of study, grouped by journal outlet (AnimCog= Animal Cognition; JEAB =
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior; JEP:ABP = Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes; JCP =
Journal of Comparative Psychology).

Beyond just these example areas, what is the range of topics covered in comparative cognition? The
answer is simple – the same range covered in human cognition. Take any Cognitive Psychology textbook that
you can find, and flip through the chapters (and subchapters within chapters), and it is likely that many of the
processes or phenomena you see there are similar to the processes that have been or are being studied in
nonhuman animals. Typically, these things will be studied using primates (and, more specifically, in most
cases this will be apes or rhesus monkeys, and in fewer cases perhaps capuchin monkeys or baboons), rats, or
pigeons. We know a lot about how stimuli are perceived, how they are processed using attention resources,
how they are categorized, stored in memory, retrieved, and used to guide decision making in both social and
physical domains. Excellent volumes now exist as starting points to get deeper into the theoretical and
empirical aspects of these areas (Bekoff, Allen, & Burghardt, 2002; Maestripieri, 2003; Shettleworth, 2009;
Tomasello & Call, 1997; Vonk & Shackelford, 2012; Zentall & Wasserman, 2012). The information
processing approach that has been so influential in human cognitive psychology has had equal influence in
comparative cognition, although it has been far less well integrated into a holistic perspective as has been done
in human psychology. And, most recently, advances in neuroimaging techniques and other neurobiological
approaches (for example, transcranial magnetic stimulation, PET, MRI, DTI) have been applied to tests of
nonhuman behavior and cognition so those results could be related back to work with humans (Hopkins,
Russell, & Schaeffer, 2012; Hopkins, Taglialatela, Russell,
Schaeffer,
& Nir, 2010; Marzluff,
Miyaoka,Minoshima, & Cross, 2012; McCoy & Platt, 2005; Nieder, 2009; Nieder, Diester, & Tudusciuc,
2006; Nieder & Miller, 2003; Phillips & Hopkins, 2012; Sawamura, Shima, Tanji, 2002; Schenker,
Desgouttes, & Semendeferi, 2005).
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Figure 2. Numbers of publications in selected research areas, shown in successive two-year periods for the last 20 years. Data come
from the Journal of Comparative Psychology and Animal Cognition.

One thing that is worth noting (and that we thank one of our anonymous reviewers for pointing this
out) is that much of what is studied in comparative cognition is not found in human cognitive psychology
texts. For example, there is little mention of numerical cognition in standard human cognition texts (although
language and other symbolic processes often are featured). There is also little coverage of social cognitive
processes, or the emergence of capacities such as self-recognition or metacognition, despite those being
studied in great detail in nonhuman animals. This suggests that work remains to be done integrating
comparative cognition into the broader cognitive science framework, although some recent volumes have
made progress in that area (Zentall & Wasserman, 2012).
Comparative Cognition – Then and Now
The comparative cognition of 20-30 years ago was dominated by some still-popular research questions
(perception, attention, memory), but many of the focal topics have changed. Critically, there has been a shift
towards more so-called “higher-order” topics of cognition that might reveal important similarities and critical
differences between human and nonhuman cognition. We outline just a few key topic areas within
comparative cognition here. Thirty years ago (and more), one of the most hotly debated questions pertained to
whether animals had anything remotely resembling the language that is ubiquitous among humans (Herman,
Richards, & Wolz, 1984; Gardner & Gardner, 1969; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986; Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993;
Schusterman & Gisiner, 1988). This was an extremely contentious and high-profile area of research (Roitblat,
Herman, & Nachtigall, 1993; Seidenberg & Pettito, 1979; Terrace et al., 1979). Today, there is a general
consensus in the field that, given the right early environment, some species develop communicative capacities
that show many of the basic but important qualities of human languages, albeit not all of those hallmarks, and
perhaps not the most critical ones. Very little research with “animal language” projects remain, although a
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number of the animals involved in that research are still participating in studies of comparative cognition,
helping to shed light on the impact of language-immersed enculturation on development and the emergence of
other cognitive competencies (Beran et al., 2000; Beran, Smith, & Perdue, 2013; Beran, Washburn, &
Rumbaugh, 2007; Bodamer & Gardner, 2002; Jensvold & Gardner, 2000; Menzel, 1999; Menzel, SavageRumbaugh, & Menzel, 2002; Pepperberg & Carey, 2012). Rather, recent research efforts have focused on
other aspects of referential communication by animals (Cartmill & Byrne, 2010; Herman et al., 2001; Leavens,
Hopkins, & Thomas, 2004; Miklosi et al., 2005; Pepperberg, 2002, 2010, 2013; Taglialatela et al., 2009).

Figure 3. A comparison of the relative numbers of papers about spatial cognition or social cognition in nonhuman animals, 2003-2012.
Data come from the Journal of Comparative Psychology and Animal Cognition.

Twenty to thirty years ago, the question of self-awareness and self-recognition was a hot topic (Gallup,
1970; Suarez & Gallup, 1981). In attempts to understand what animals understand of their own minds and the
minds of others, mirror self-recognition and theory-of-mind studies were highly publicized and heavily
debated (Bard et al., 2006; Epstein, Skinner, & Skinner, 1981). Recently, similar studies have been conducted
using these tests with a variety of species (Delfour & Marten, 2001; Pepperberg, Garcia, Jackson, & Marconi,
1995; Plotnik, de Waal, & Reiss, 2006; Prior, Schwarz, & Güntürkün, 2008; Reiss & Marino, 2001; Roma et
al., 2007). A closely related capacity involves understanding the mental states of others as separate and
potentially different from one’s own mental states - what is referred to as theory of mind. Comparative
approaches to theory of mind examine which species might achieve a human-like level of ‘mind-reading’, or
how other capacities such as behavior-reading might also be beneficial for understanding and predicting the
actions of conspecifics (Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Leslie, 1987; Lurz, 2011; Penn & Povinelli, 2007;
Premack & Woodruff, 1978).
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Table 1
Species represented and topic areas reported during the last five years for the journal Animal Cognition
Year
Species Represented
2008
Dogs
Mandrills
Social Learning
Bowerbirds
Horses
Dominance Rank
Chimpanzees
Degus
Culture
Lemurs
Wolves
Theory of Mind
Ravens
Rhesus Monkeys
Deception
Capuchin monkeys
Stickelbacks
Social Orienting
Marmosets
Pigeons
Gaze Following

	
  

Topic Areas
Social Foraging
Face Discrimination
Reputation Learning
Kin Recognition
Self-Recognition
Gestural Communication
Enculturation Effects

2009

Gray Parrots
Ants
Mangabeys
Dolphins
Dogs
Keas
Rhesus Monkeys
Capuchin Monkeys
Chimpanzees
Chicks

Orangutans
Bonobos
Gorillas
Lemurs
Prairie Dogs
Zebra Finches
Quail
Horses
Canaries
Cichlid fish

Experimenter Cues
Collective Problem Solving
Emotional Perception
Social Learning
Attention to Conspecifics
Social Attention
Face Recognition
Self-Recognition
Capability of Others
Song Sharing

Theory of Mind
Imprinting
Gestural Communication
Inequity
Gaze Following
Cross-Fostering
Reciprocity
Token Transfer/Competition
ID recognition
Contagious Yawning

2010

Beetles
Humans
Capuchin Monkeys
Dingoes
Gorillas
Horses
Dogs
Macaques

Walrus
Rooks
Tortoise
Chimpanzees
Baboons
Ungulates
Orangutans
Tamarins

Kin recognition
Face recognition
Cooperative Breeding
Attentional states
Theory of Mind
Gestural communication
Human Cue Reading
Cooperation

Play
Altruism
Gaze following
Reciprocity
Culture
Animal Communication
Triadic and Collaborative

2011

Nutcrackers
Dogs
Chimpanzees
Rhesus Monkeys
African Grey Parrot
Gorillas
Capuchin Monkeys

Fish
Pigeons
Magpies
Bees
Geese
Ungulates
Horses

Gestural communication
Conflict
Human Cue Following
Facial Recognition
ID recognition
Facial Expression Discrimination

Cooperation
Vocal recognition
ID recognition
Social Learning
Helping Behavior
Prosocial behavior

2012

Dogs
Deer
Human Children
Capuchin Monkeys
Diana Monkeys
Rhesus Monkeys
Squirrel Monkeys
Lemurs

Bonobos
Marine Fish
Canaries
Horses
Invertebrates
Goats
Gibbons
Crocodiles

Social Referencing
Attention/Communication with Humans
Facial/kin recognition
Emotional Recognition
Social Learning
Courtship
Contagious Yawning

Recognition of humans
Vocal recognition
Empathy
Bonding
Theory of Mind
Visual Perspective Taking
Point Following

11

	
  

There has been a shift to greater emphasis on understanding how animals see conspecifics and their
role in cooperative or competitive contexts and on how a theory of mind would reveal itself in social
interactions, including those in which deception or “mindreading” would be necessary (Bugnyar, 2007;
Bugnyar & Heinrich, 2005; Call, Brauer, Kaminski, & Tomasello, 2003; Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2008;
Krachun, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; Krachun, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2010; Tempelmann, Kaminski, &
Liebal, 2011; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 2003; Tomonaga, Uwano, Ogura, & Saito, 2010). Organisms may
engage in passive or active forms of deception via withholding valuable information from group members (for
example, about the location of a foraging site) or providing faulty information (for example, alarm calls in the
absence of a predator), respectively (Byrne & Whiten, 1992; Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). As one might expect,
there remains a vigorous debate about what these kinds of tests exactly reveal about self-awareness and theory
of mind in animals (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Horowitz, 2011; Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008; Roberts &
MacPherson, 2011; Udell & Wynne, 2011).
A related topic that was nonexistent in the field of comparative psychology 20 years ago regards
metacognitive abilities in animals. This area focuses on whether nonhuman animals monitor their own
cognitive states and can seek information, monitor uncertainty, and even adjust their estimates of confidence in
their own knowledge. Although there have been many suggestive reports, particularly with primate species
(Beran & Smith, 2011; Call, 2010; Hampton, 2001; Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007; Smith, Beran, Redford, &
Washburn, 2006; Smith, Redford, Beran, & Washburn, 2010; Smith, Shields, Schull, & Washburn, 1997;
Suda-King, 2008), but also some non-primate species (Adams & Santi, 2011; Foote & Crystal, 2007; Smith et
al., 1995), this too is a contested area of research with an active ongoing debate about the appropriate
interpretation of these programs of research and the data they generate (Carruthers, 2008, 2009; Crystal &
Foote, 2009; Hampton, 2009; Kornell, 2009, 2013; Le Pelley, 2012; Jozefowiez, Staddon, & Cerutti, 2009;
Smith, 2009; Smith, Beran, Couchman, & Coutinho, 2008).
Twenty years ago, another “hot” topic was whether animals could count, and whether number even
was a relevant stimulus dimension to which animals responded (Boysen & Capaldi, 1993; Davis & Perusse,
1988; Pepperberg, 1994). At the time, the jury was out, and it seemed difficult to know how salient
numerosity was for animals (Davis & Memmott, 1982). We now know fairly definitively that number is
salient, and that animals make use of number in many circumstances (Brannon & Roitman, 2003; Gallistel &
Gelman, 2000; Pepperberg, 2006). Performances of animals in various quantitative tasks can look very much
like the performances of young children, and in some cases can even be quite similar to the performance of
adult humans (Cantlon & Brannon, 2006; Cordes, Gallistel, Gelman, & Whalen, 2001; Menzel, 1960;
Tomonaga & Matsuzawa, 2002; Whalen, Gallistel, & Gelman, 1999). But, we also know that animals do not
count, at least not without massive efforts to instill such counting routines (Beran & Rumbaugh, 20001;
Boysen & Berntson, 1989; Matsuzawa, 1985; Pepperberg, 1994, 2012; Pepperberg & Carey, 2012; Pepperberg
& Gordon, 2005), and even then performance is underwhelming compared to what a 4- or 5-year-old child can
do (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978). The more recent controversy has been about the nature of nonverbal
representation of number and quantity, and whether animals require and access one or two “core systems of
number,” and a large amount of research has been conducted as part of this debate (Beran, 2004, 2007, 2008,
2012; Beran & Beran, 2004; Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004; Gomez-Laplaza, & Gerlai, 2011; Hanus &
Call, 2007; Hauser, Carey, & Hauser, 2000; Jordan & Brannon, 2006; Nieder, 2005; Piffer, Agrillo, & Hyde,
2012; Perdue, Talbot, Stone, & Beran, 2012; Rugani, Cavazzana, Vallortigara, & Regolin, 2013; Tomonaga,
2007; Ujfalussy, Miklósi, Bugnyar, & Kotrschal, in press; Vonk & Beran, 2012).
In a trajectory that mimics the evolution of research into human memory, the study of animal memory
has diversified through the years. Assessments of memory for short and long durations remain a focus of
priority in comparative cognition, in large part because of their importance in many relevant areas of
intervention with different groups of humans (for eample, Alzheimer’s patients). Early research was focused
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on general memory processes, such as working and reference memory (Olten & Papas, 1979; Olten &
Samuelson, 1976), but this focus has gradually diverged into several areas including, but certainly not limited
to, spatial, episodic and prospective memory (Balda & Kamil, 1992; Balda & Wiltscheko, 1995; Bednekoff,
Balda, Kamil, & Hile, 1997; Checke & Clayton, 2012; Clayton & Dickinson, 1998, 1999; Clayton, Yu, &
Dickinson, 2003; Griffiths, Dickinson, & Clayton, 1999; Perdue, Evans, Williamson, Gonsiorowski, Beran,
2013; Perdue, Snyder, Pratte, Marr, & Maple 2009; Perdue, Snyder, Zhihe, Marr & Maple, 2011).
Accordingly, there has been a fairly stable representation of “general” memory in the literature, while areas
such as episodic and prospective memory have increased in recent years (see Figure 2).
Episodic memory is memory for personally experienced events (Tulving, 1972). There has been an
intense debate about whether animals are capable of experiencing the autonoetic feelings associated with the
true recollection of a personally experienced episode (Wheeler, Stuss & Tulving, 1997). Thus, animal
researchers have focused on what is referred to as episodic-like memory, or memory for the what-where-when
of an event (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Correia, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007; Feeney, Roberts, & Sherry,
2009; Griffiths et al., 1999; Hampton, Hampstead, & Murray, 2005; Hoffman, Beran, & Washburn, 2009;
Menzel, 1999). This has spurred a great deal of research that includes a continued pursuit of the idea of
agency and awareness.
Prospective memory refers to remembering to engage in some behavior at a specified time in the
future (Cheke & Clayton, 2012; Clayton, Salwiczek & Dickinson, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007).
This area of research is still developing in the comparative literature, but there is growing evidence that
animals show similar, albeit less complex, forms of prospective memory and planning ability to that observed
in humans (Beran, Perdue, Bramlett, Menzel, & Evans, 2012; Perdue, Evans, Williamson, Gonsiorowski,
Beran, 2013; Raby & Clayton, 2009; Wilson & Crystal, 2012; Wilson, Pizzo & Crystal; 2013).
Finally, spatial memory, or more broadly, spatial cognition, has spurred a great deal of research within
animal cognition (Gould, 1986, 1990; Gresack, & Frick, 2003; Healy, Braham, & Braithwaite, 1999; Kelly &
Gibson, 2007; Lacreuse, Herndon, Killiany, Rosene, & Moss, 1999; Langley, 1994; Lipp et al., 2001;
MacDonald, 1994; Morris, Garrud, Rawlins & O'Keefe, 1982; Washburn & Astur, 2003). From the early work
of Tolman (1932) suggesting that rats constructed cognitive maps, there has been substantial interest in how
animals navigate through the world and remember and respond to information about location. Spatial
cognition has remained a constant presence in the animal literature for the last 20 years and continued research
explores how neural systems underlie these abilities and how ecological pressures have shaped these processes
in many species (Gaulin & Fitzgerald, 1989; Sherry, Jacobs & Gaulin, 1992).
Comparative Social Cognition
Another area of research that is dominant in comparative cognition pertains to social cognitive
processes. Social cognition consists of the suite of cognitive skills used for interacting with other individuals,
including individuals that are related and nonrelated, opponents and collaborators. The complexity of a
species’ social group will dictate the level of cognitive skill required to effectively navigate one’s social world.
For species that form relatively long-term, complex, and stable social groups comprised of multiple individuals
of variable social status, the ability to recognize individuals and their relationships is a key component to social
living. Although early experimental psychology primarily focused on the cognitive capacities of animals in
isolation of their larger social network, the shift to a comprehensive approach to cognition, including both
physical and social domains has become highly emphasized. Within comparative psychology and ethology,
the study of social cognition has transformed over the past several decades into a multi-faceted and integrative
field that incorporates multiple species and a variety of experimental approaches, including field and
laboratory studies (for reviews, see Shettleworth, 2010; Zentall & Wasserman, 2012).
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The in-depth study of social cognition gained momentum with early long-term field studies of
nonhuman primates that inhabit relatively large and complex social groups (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; de
Waal, 1982; Goodall, 1986; Kummer, 1982). Several hypotheses regarding the evolution of higher-order
cognitive abilities arose from this work, suggesting that intelligence among highly social species was selected
for in response to an unstable and fluctuating social environment in comparison to the animals’ relatively static
physical world. The Social Intelligence Hypothesis predicts that the evolution of intelligence among primates
is a direct result of group living with multiple individuals of varying relations (Humphrey, 1976; Jolly, 1966).
The related Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis suggests that the unique nature of competition among
conspecifics drove the evolution of primate intelligence as individuals not only cooperate with one another, but
also must compete and outmaneuver their social counterparts (Byrne & Whiten, 1988). The growing literature
assessing social cognition among non-primate mammals and birds suggests that social theories of intelligence
may not be exclusive to primates. Additionally, whether social and physical cognition are truly distinct entities
is an important and related question within this field. It has been suggested that cognition evolved in response
to a variety of selective pressures (both social and nonsocial), and social cognition reflects the application of a
larger and more general suite of cognitive capacities to explicitly social settings and problems (Gigerenzer,
1997; Healy & Rowe, 2007; Holekamp 2007; Shettleworth, 2010).
We have space here to provide only a selective list of key topic areas within social cognition, and then
consider how the field has developed and transformed over the past ten years. An organism’s ability to
identify and recognize conspecifics and their relationships (related/nonrelated; dominant/subordinate;
ally/opponent; in-group/out-group) is an important factor in socially living species. Additional areas of
research within social cognition include cooperation, social learning, communication, deception, and theory of
mind.
Individual recognition and relationship classification has been a large focus of social cognition studies
among a wide variety of species, ranging from studies of mother/offspring recognition to third party
relationships and transitive inference. Methodologies within this topic area are diverse (for example, face
perception tasks, field playback experiments, etc.), providing information on whether organisms require and
subsequently utilize individual recognition, what they understand about the nature of their own relations and
others’ relations within and outside of their social hierarchy, and how this knowledge translates to novel
settings and individuals (Colgan, 1983; Falls, 1982; Holmes & Sherman, 1983).
Beyond individual recognition, social cognition investigates the relationships that develop between
conspecifics and how information transfers between individuals. Many species (for example, nonhuman
primates, dolphins) are known for their ability to form coalitions and alliances that are often maintained
through long-term affiliative interactions (Connor, Smolker, & Richards, 1992; de Waal, 1982; Goodall, 1986;
Packer & Pusey, 1982). Studies on cooperation investigate whether, and under what circumstances, species
work together with related and nonrelated individuals, including topic areas such as mutualism, reciprocity,
and altruism (see Brosnan & Bshary, 2010; Dugatkin, 1997). Social learning, or the transfer of information
between conspecifics, also may occur among group-living species, which would facilitate the rapid transfer of
information within a social group. Social learning studies examine a range of interactions including learning
basic information from others via local or stimulus enhancement or more interactive and directed learning via
emulation (replicating end-states) and imitation (copying actions) (Byrne, 2002; Heyes, 1994; Whiten & Ham,
1992; Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). In some species, social learning may culminate
into more advanced culture or culture-like traditions that are also a key area of inquiry in comparative
cognition (Krützen, Mann, Heithaus, Connor, Bejder, & Sherwin, 2005; Whiten et al., 2002).
How social species transfer information between individuals via multiple sensory modalities (visual,
auditory, olfactory, tactile) is investigated within the field of communication (Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 1998).
Research investigating the production and reception of communicative information (for example, alarm calls)
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provides rich information on the type of material conveyed between individuals, and the level of control that
an organism might have over such interactions (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Owren & Rendall, 1997).
Communication also may be gestural in nature and is often studied as the precursor to human language,
leading to the investigation of language or language-like abilities in nonhuman species (Heimbauer, Beran, &
Owren, 2011; Leavens & Hopkins, 1998; Rumbaugh, 1977; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986).
Future Research Goals for Comparative Cognition
Comparative cognition needs to continue on a three-pronged path. First, it must continue to broaden
its comparative approach – more species, more tests, and more replication. The focus should not be only on
the comparative cognition of primates (or rats, or pigeons) but on the comparative cognition of all animals,
even though, of course, individual research teams may focus more heavily on some species than others (as is
true with our own research with primates). Our interest in any psychological phenomenon should not be
through how it manifests in a single assessment or single test, but how it manifests across contexts and across
tests, thereby providing a more robust database on the cognitive abilities of animals. And, our confidence in
what animals can (and cannot) do can only grow when we replicate the singular findings that often are held as
benchmarks for the cognitive capacities of whole species. It is through replication that we can more
confidently apply descriptions using cognitive constructs to the behavior of nonhuman animals. This is not a
unique issue to comparative psychology, but to science in general, and is an issue that is gaining strength
through increased emphasis on valuing replication (including new initiatives to report replication attempts in
journals such as Perspectives on Psychological Science), and an awareness of how often research reports are
difficult to replicate and may be false (Ioannidis, 2005).
Second, the field of comparative cognition must intensify its understanding of the processes that
underlie performances that, at the surface, appear to be cognitive in their manifestation. This means that it is
not simply enough to show what animals can (or cannot) do, but rather to devise clever methods that allow us
to understand how and why they do the things that they do. Here, the measures used must be sensitive to
delineating the mechanisms that underlie behavior and must be sensitive to the proper contexts in which these
behaviors are likely to occur in the natural settings in which animals evolved and currently live.
Third, the field of comparative cognition must continue to look across research topics to broader
research areas. This has happened in the past, as when ape language studies complemented more ethologically
based assessments of the communicative abilities of animals, including in terms of referential communication
(Seyfarth, Cheney, & Marler, 1980; Zuberbuhler, Cheney, & Seyfarth, 1999). Another example is the
broadening of the search for counting behavior to the more inclusive understanding of how magnitudes and
quantities of all types are represented by a variety of species (Brannon & Roitman, 2003; Gallistel & Gelman,
2001; Pepperberg, 2006). Today, we take the perspective that many of the cognitive skills that we study in
animals may fall under broader areas than we tend to study. For example, our research team sees the value in
approaching our individual topic areas (for example, self-control, attentional control, memory retrieval,
planning, prospective memory, perceptual processing and decision-making) as they relate to the notion of
behavioral inhibition, and the emergence of cognitive control. This “forest” instead of “trees” approach has
led to greater cross-talk among our team, and we expect it would do the same for the field as a whole. For
example, greater attention to what one means by “social cognition versus physical cognition” could help
situate and maximize the value of data from a variety of tasks given to animals. Greater attention to the role of
individual differences across research topics also could serve the same purpose (Matzel, Wass, & Kolata,
2011; Vonk & Povinelli, 2011), as could more focus on the ontogenetic emergence of any of the topics
traditionally held as part of comparative cognition.
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Our Individual Perspectives on the Future of Comparative Cognition
What should the future of comparative cognition be in general? Here, our opinions varied, and
although we found some common ground, we also had unique perspectives that are outlined below. The reader
will also recognize some familiar themes, some of which are now more than 100 years old.
Parrish. As the field advances, my hope is for the continuing development of a more inclusive and
comprehensive construction of an animal’s psychology. As is common among most psychological literatures
(including in our own current review!), physical and social cognition are typically subdivided and studied
independently of one another. As we progress, I anticipate a more integrative outlook on these traditionally
isolated areas of comparative cognition. Although this approach serves practical and functional purposes, we
are beginning to see cross talk among these subfields, and this is exciting. Cognition results from the
inevitable interplay between an organism’s physical and social domains; thus, in constructing the mental
minds’ of others, we must study their psychology from a holistic perspective. Additionally, I suspect there will
be a stronger emphasis on a multifaceted approach towards similar questions within comparative psychology,
including both the inclusion of more animal species and a wider range of methodologies. By definition,
comparative cognition strives to investigate the psychological mechanisms and behavioral manifestations
among multiple species and, critically, how those compare and contrast with one another. Moreover, multiple
methodological approaches to similar questions will help elucidate whether and how cognition differs between
species and even among species. Thus, for the future, I anticipate a particular emphasis on issues of
integration and collaboration within the field of comparative cognition.
Perdue. In the coming years, a priority within animal cognition will be to protect our science by
rekindling and retaining the methodologically rigorous roots from which the field has grown. Early
behaviorists were focused only on observable, overt behavior in an effort to establish a replicable science
grounded in observation. The cognitive revolution opened the door for more in depth exploration of the
cognitive processes underlying an animal’s behavior, but this door may be swinging too far open, allowing for
too highly anthropomorphized and untestable suppositions about the causes of behavior. It is imperative that
the field of comparative cognition remain rigorous in the scientific methodology and peer-review process to
avoid the paradigmatic pendulum swinging too far to one side. Animals do not have to be identical to humans
in all aspects to be fascinating and worth studying. Additionally, with the rise of cognitivism, there seems to
be a demonization of “associationism” within comparative psychology that is not only unnecessary, but
potentially harmful to the field. Much of any animal’s behavior, including that of humans, can indeed be
explained by principles of classical and operant conditioning. More focus should be made on how cognition
overlays learning to yield the fascinating feats of some organisms, rather than a harsh dismissal of learning
processes as if they are irrelevant to understanding animal behavior. The field will benefit from a greater focus
on understanding the interactions and relation between learning and cognition rather than a swing towards fully
embracing one while ignoring the other. By developing stringent methods that prevent cuing, avoiding
overinterpretation of results, and focusing on cognition as complementary and supplemental to learning, the
field of comparative cognition will continue to thrive and grow in the coming years.
Beran. The comparative perspective informs our understanding of human uniqueness as much as it
does of humans’ relatedness to other animals’ psychologies. This is its purpose – to illustrate what we alone
may be capable of in terms of our cognitive capacities by discounting those things that are not uniquely human,
and then by looking at what remains. Comparative cognition needs to be agnostic. It needs to be objective. It
cannot be driven by a desire to elevate (or reduce) the cognitive abilities of animals, per se, and it cannot be
driven by ignorance of species’ unique perceptual and cognitive mechanisms, or by ignorance of the role of
other, non-cognitive processes (such as associative learning) that complement or, in some cases, compete with
cognitive ones.

	
  
	
  

16

	
  

The future of comparative cognition must be in the delineation and description of those processes that
complement the associative processes which presumably account for so much of animal (and human!)
behavior, but cannot account for all it. A comparative cognition that ignores the role of associative processes
is like a theory of economic decision making that ignores what people really do and focuses only on what they
should do, given that they “must be rational.” It would be like a physics that advances only the consequences
of a general relativity without a special relativity.
Comparative cognition must embrace its “comparative” charter – we need more data, from more
species. These data must come from species-fair tests, and from tests that are designed with a sensitivity to
(and memory of) our mistakes of the past in terms of cuing animals (Beran, 2012). Comparative cognition
must do a better job of recognizing the changes in cognition that occur within the lifespan of a given animal.
We know beyond doubt that there is no single “human cognition.” There is the cognition of the infant, of the
toddler, of the school child, of the human version of the white lab rat (college kids, age 18-22), of the adult,
and of the aged. Cognitive psychology addresses these critical issues, in conjunction with developmental
psychology, and comparative cognition must do the same. Some efforts have been made, but more are needed
(see Thornton & Lukas, 2012).
We also run the risk of overselling the cognitive abilities of animals. We run the risk that, through
over-inclusion, we may reduce the impact of finding human-like cognitive abilities in species or individuals for
whom such evidence is truly informative about how those abilities emerged in our species. In some cases, this
over-inclusion is warranted. For example, it seems beyond question that nearly all species yet to be tested will
show some sensitivity to the quantitative and even numerical properties of stimuli, given that all species tested
to date have shown this. And, we see great similarities across species in the existence of memory stores,
although the content and processes that access those stores is likely quite different, including for things such as
episodic memory and future oriented behavior. But, the point is that comparative cognition serves little or no
value if its goal becomes to work to admit as many species as possible into “the club” of thinking creatures.
And, comparative cognition betrays its mission when it panders to the desires of the public who simply want to
find that animals are “smart” so as to boost beliefs about the “worth” of that species. The value of any species
should not be related to its intellectual ability, or to its similarity to how humans perceive and interact with the
world, and a comparative cognition that takes that as its mission is misguided, and even dangerous. We have
been down that road before, and the blatant anthropomorphism and over-interpretation (along with weak
methodological designs that allowed for cuing of animals) set the stage for the strong pushback that was
radical behaviorism. This risk still exists, and grows stronger whenever weak results are over-interpreted, and
whenever animal behavior that has multiple possible causes is automatically assumed to be of the “highest
form” that most closely approximates human behavior.
Washburn. There are tremendous benefits to the study of cognition comparatively. (As an aside, it is
significant how much less controversial it feels to say that one studies animal cognition than to say that one
studies animal minds—the former seems to allow one to be agnostic with respect to the question of
consciousness! But are the terms really that different?) Humans surely categorize. Monkeys surely attend.
Rats surely remember. Bees surely communicate. Even cats surely learn! Understanding the cognitive
processes (concept formation, attention, memory, language, and so forth) that correspond to these behavioral
statements and that may mediate stimulus-response relations must then embrace behavioral data across species.
This is the strength and promise of contemporary “cognitive science,” which incorporates information from
computer science and neuroscience and philosophy and psychology (cognitive, developmental, cross-cultural,
and—yes—comparative). Moreover, there are opportunities for replication, for experimental control, and for
convergence/divergence in the comparative method that are more elusive when studying cognition only in
humans.
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That said, a cognitive psychology that includes nonhuman animals is still cognitive psychology, and
accordingly is subject to all the same criticisms and threats that have plagued cognitive research for the last
five decades. Cognitive psychology, whether comparative or not, tends to be highly fractionated,
phenomenon-driven, and theoretically circular. Cognitive psychologists, comparative or otherwise, sometimes
forget that our constructs (such as attention, episodic memory) are shorthand for collections of behaviors as
measured on specific groups of tests; rather, these constructs become reified, giving truth to Skinner’s (1985)
criticism that cognitive psychologists treat descriptions as explanations and invent “explanatory systems which
are admired for a profundity which is more properly called inaccessibility” (p. 42). Cognitive psychology,
comparative or otherwise, has a self-confidence problem, and so runs to neuroscience or to applied fields for
support whenever someone challenges its necessity or utility. In truth, I believe that comparative strategies for
cognitive research can help with all of these criticisms, helping to ground our theory and to challenge our
assumptions. Moreover, I am encouraged by developments within cognitive psychology that suggest that
some of the diverse and tangled threads are starting to form a coherent fabric: recent publications in the
attention (Posner, 2012) and working-memory (Redick & Engle, 2011) literatures, for example, suggest that
the answers are emerging to some complicated and long-asked cognitive questions. I believe that the teamscience approach where groups of scholars tackle common questions using various tools, strategies, and levels
of analysis has great promise within cognitive psychology, comparative or otherwise. However, any future for
cognitive psychology, and for comparative cognition more specifically, requires resolution of the
aforementioned criticisms and concerns.
I was born the year after Bitterman (1960) was published. I was trained as an undergraduate by a
behaviorist in an operant laboratory, and entered graduate school at a time when it was ok to say that one was
studying animal cognition. Indeed, it was encouraged by the funding opportunities, publication outlets, and the
like, which by the 1980s were more receptive to “attention and memory” than to “orienting behavior and
remembering behavior.” I consider myself fortunate to have experienced the best of both of these worlds—
rigorous methodological and theoretical behaviorism married with the challenges of making inferences about
the processing of information by humans and other animals. I think also of a mentor, Duane Rumbaugh, who
began his career in psychology as a Hullian and who has been a leader in the field of comparative cognition,
forging a unified theory that embraces respondent, operant, and emergent behavior (Rumbaugh, 2013).
Consider the other leaders in the field of comparative cognition: Wasserman, Zentall, Shettleworth, and too
many others to list. Each was trained in a behaviorist tradition that provided a theoretical and empirical
foundation and a repertoire of research strategies that can be applied to the study of animal cognition. It seems
to me that these examples of how the field has changed across each of our lifetimes yield at least two
implications for the future: First, I am concerned that we are not leaving the field in better shape than we found
it. Science is supposed to be cumulative, and I hope that the current and future generations of comparativecognition researchers are getting as solid a foundation in behavioral science as did their academic parents. I
worry also about the future of comparative cognition in light of the funding climate, academic job prospects,
and many political pressures at work against comparative psychology now versus when I entered the field.
The dramatic changes in comparative psychology over the last half-century suggest a second
implication for the future. Fifty years hence, as psychology approaches its bicentennial birthday, comparative
cognition (or whatever it is called then) seems likely to be much different than can be predicted based on its
current state!
All Authors. In the end, we promote an optimistic perspective for the future of comparative
cognition, and comparative psychology more broadly. We remain committed to the promise of greater
knowledge through comparative approaches to cognition, and we remain committed to the promise that the
science of human psychology cannot exist without understanding its comparative and evolutionary
foundations. And, we remain committed to one final idea – that we are fortunate to be able to learn from
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animals, and that we will continue to enjoy doing so with the same passion shown by those who established
this area of scientific inquiry.
Since all the sciences, and especially psychology, are still immersed in such tremendous realms of the
uncertain and the unknown, the best that any individual scientist, especially any psychologist, can do
seems to be to follow his own gleam and his own bent, however inadequate they may be. In fact, I
suppose that actually this is what we all do. In the end, the only sure criterion is to have fun. (Tolman,
1959, p. 374)
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